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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that appellant Diamond B-Y Ranches 
("Diamond") had no constitutionally protected property interest in the favorable 
consideration or approval of an application for a conditional use permit which would 
support a takings claim? The existence of a protected property interest for purposes of 
federal and state constitutional analysis is a question of law reviewed on appeal with no 
deference to the ruling of the trial court. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 
(Utah 1995). This issue was preserved before the trial court in the County's summary 
judgment memorandum (R. 137) and was expressly addressed by die trial court in its 
memorandum decision. (R. 272-73.) 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling on summary judgment that the County's 
denial of Diamond's application for a conditional use permit was not arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 based on Diamond's failure 
to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance and provide the necessary information to 
support its application and could not support a takings claim? A trial court's summary 
judgment presents a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness according no 
deference to the trial court's decision. Hale v. BecksteacL 2003 UT App. 240,11 8, 74 P.3d 
628, 629. This issue was preserved before the trial court in the County's summary 
judgment memorandum. (R. 139) and the trial court's memorandum decision. (R. 271-
72.) 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22. 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use widiout 
just compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(c). 
"Conditional use55 means a land use that, because of its unique 
characteristics or potential impact on the county, surrounding 
neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas 
or may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that 
mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-406(1). 
A zoning ordinance may contain provisions for administrative 
decisions relating to conditional uses that may be allowed, allowed 
with conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts, based on 
compliance with standards and criteria set forth in the zoning 
ordinance for those uses. 
§ 7 - 1 , Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County. 
A conditional use is a land use that, because of its unique 
characteristics or potential impact on die county, surrounding 
neighbors or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas 
or may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that 
mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts. 
§7-3 , Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County. 
The listing of a conditional use in any table of permitted and 
conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of this Uniform 
Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County for each category of zoning 
district does not constitute an assurance or presumption that such 
conditional use will be approved. Rather, each proposed conditional 
use shall be evaluated on an individual basis, in relation to its 
compliance with the standards and conditions set forth in this chapter 
and with the standards for die district in which it is located, in order 
to determine whether the conditional use is appropriate at the 
particular location. 
§ 7-5(2), Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County. 
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In authorizing any conditional use the Planning Commission or 
zoning administrator shall impose such requirements and conditions as 
are necessary for protection of adjacent properties and the public 
welfare. A conditional use permit shall not be authorized unless 
sufficient evidence is presented to establish that: 
(a) such use will not, under the circumstances of this particular 
case, be detrimental to the health, safety, comfort, order or 
general welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity; 
(b) the conditions for the use will: 
(ii) make the use harmonious with the neighboring uses 
in the zoning district; 
(c) nuisances diat would not be in harmony with neighboring 
uses will be abated by the conditions imposed; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter arises from an application by Diamond B-Y Ranches ("Diamond") to 
Tooele County for a conditional use permit to use its property for sand and gravel 
extraction. The case is presented in a somewhat unusual procedural posture. Aldiough die 
County's land use decisions are subject to petitions for judicial review under Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-1001, Diamond made a conscious tactical decision to concede that the land 
use decision was reasonable and proceeded directly to assert a takings claim before the trial 
court. This tactic improperly presented die trial court with a constitutional question which 
could have been avoided on state law grounds by resolving die question of whether 
Diamond had a protected property interest which would make denial of die conditional use 
illegal under § 17-27-1001. 
Diamond's position from the beginning has been that it was entitled, as a matter of 
right, to the approval of the conditional use permit subject only to the imposition of 
reasonable conditions. This belief, however, is inconsistent with well established Utah law 
regarding die nature of conditional uses and die specific provisions of the County's zoning 
ordinance, which expressly precluded any presumption that die use would be granted. 
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Believing the application process to be futile, Diamond announced that it would no 
longer participate in the process and demanded that the application be approved or denied. 
Following the County's denial of the application for failure to satisfy the ordinance 
requirements. Diamond initiated this action asserting a claim for a talcing without just 
compensation. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter came before the district court framed primarily as a takings claim rather 
dian focusing on the statutory petition for review of the County's land use decision 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001. After concluding that all material facts were 
contained in its record of the conditional use application, the County moved for summary 
judgment. The trial court ruled by memorandum decision that Diamond had no protected 
property interest as a matter of law in the favorable consideration or approval of an 
application for a conditional use permit which would support a takings claim and that the 
County's denial of the application was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
Diamond filed its Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2003, and appealed the trial court 
ruling to the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court subsequently assigned the appeal 
to this Court. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are relatively simple and undisputed.1 Diamond owns property 
which lies in Tooele County on the north side of the Town of Stockton, with a substantial 
portion already situated within Stockton. (R. 128.) The entire property is identified in 
Stockton's annexation policy plan for possible future annexation into the Town. (R. 120-
26.) It is zoned MU-40, a zoning which prior to January 23, 2001, allowed gravel 
extraction operations and associated activities as conditionally permitted uses. (R. 115-18.) 
The definition of conditional use in the County's zoning ordinance contemplates the 
possibility that a use may not be permitted in some areas otherwise zoned for conditional 
uses. 
A conditional use is a land use that, because of its unique 
characteristics or potential impact on the county, surrounding 
neighbors or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas 
or may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that 
mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts. 
(§7-1, Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County, R. 113, emphasis added.) The plain 
language of die ordinance also unambiguously establishes that there is no presumption that 
a conditional use permit will be granted for a use at a particular site. 
The listing of a conditional use in any table of permitted and 
conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of this Uniform 
Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County for each category of zoning 
district does not constitute an assurance or presumption diat such 
conditional use will be approved. Rather, each proposed conditional 
use shall be evaluated on an individual basis, in relation to its 
}It is important to recognize that Diamond's "Statement of Facts55 are, in reality, 
legal arguments radier than statements of fact. Much of that argument appears to be 
directed to convincing the Court that the County was predisposed to deny Diamond's 
conditional use application, therefore justifying their failure to meaningfully participate in 
the analysis and evaluation of potential adverse impacts presented by the proposed use of 
die property. There is no evidence in the factual record, however, to lend credibility to diat 
conclusion. 
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compliance with the standards and conditions set forth in this chapter 
and with the standards for the district in which it is located, in order 
to determine whether the conditional use is appropriate at the 
particular location. 
(§ 7-3, Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County, R. 113, emphasis added.) The 
ordinance specifies die standards for approval of a conditional use permit at a particular site. 
In authorizing any conditional use the Planning Commission or 
zoning administrator shall impose such requirements and conditions as 
are necessary for protection of adjacent properties and the public 
welfare. A conditional use permit shall not be authorized unless 
sufficient evidence is presented to establish that: 
(a) such use will not, under the circumstances of this particular 
case, be detrimental to the health, safety, comfort, order or 
general welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity; 
(b) the conditions for die use will: 
(ii) make the use harmonious widi the neighboring uses 
in the zoning district; 
(c) nuisances that would not be in harmony with neighboring 
uses will be abated by the conditions imposed; 
(§7-5(2), Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County, R. 113.) The County Planning 
Commission may require the submission of other documents in addition to those specified 
in die ordinance in order to facilitate its evaluation of the conditional use permit 
application. (§ 7-4(2), Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County, R. 113.) 
On July 12, 2000, Geneva Rock Products, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit 
to operate a gravel pit, concrete batch plant and asphalt hot plant on Diamond's property. 
(R. 107-08.) The P i n i n g Commission first considered the application at its work 
meeting on July 19, 2000. At the meeting, several concerns were raised, many regarding 
die impact of die Geneva Rock operation on die Town of Stockton. The planning staff 
recommended diat die applicant provide an environmental impact study to permit die 
commission to fully evaluate the potential impact of the proposed conditional use. The 
representative of Geneva Rock stated that the company would be willing to pay for the EIS. 
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He also stated that the company was not aware of the concerns of the public and that there 
were other complications with its use of the site. He indicated that the company would 
review the new information and might not pursue the application. The Planning 
Commission voted unanimously to table the application pending submission of die EIS. 
(Minutes, Tooele County Planning Commission work meeting, July 19, 2000, R. 103-05.) 
Geneva Rock did not subsequently submit the EIS or complete the application process. 
On Januaiy 16, 2001, Geneva Rock assigned to Diamond its application for a 
conditional use permit. By letter dated Januaiy 24, 2001, Diamond notified die County of 
the assignment and its desire to proceed with the permit process. (Letter from Allen K. 
Young dated January 24, 2001, R. 98-101.) 
On January 23, 2001, The Tooele County Commission enacted Ordinance 2001-05 
which created a new zoning district specifically for mining, quarry, sand and gravel 
excavation, MG-EX, and eliminated those activities as a conditional use in MU zones. 
(R. 61.) Because Diamond's conditional use application, originally filed by Geneva Rock, 
predated the zoning amendments, Diamond was entitled to pursue the application under 
the previous ordinance. 
On February 21, 2001, Diamond applied for rezoning of the Property to MG-EX. 
(R. 51.) Based largely on its staff recommendation, the Planning Commission voted to 
recommend denial of Diamond's rezone application. (R. 40-42.) The Tooele County 
Commission considered the rezone application on April 21, 2001, and May 1, 2001, voting 
on both occasions to continue the application for further information. (R. 23-25, 28-31.) 
After a public hearing on May 22, 2001, the County Commission voted 2-1 to deny the 
rezone application. (R. 18-21.) Diamond did not seek judicial review of this denial under 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(2)(a). 
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In evaluating Diamond's application for a conditional use permit, the County 
planning staff identified a number of issues raising concerns about potential impacts upon 
residents of the Town of Stockton, including: 
1. Mining out a section of the Stockton bar would potentially expose the 
Town of Stockton to more odors created by the landfills5 composting operation; 
2. If the bar came down it would affect weather patterns; 
3. How bad this plant would be for anyone who has asthma or other 
health problems; 
4. The operation is next to a residential area; 
5. The bar is a buffer zone to protect the community; 
6. The safety of the community is at risk with the amount of traffic the 
pit would put on the highway; 
7. The pit would be affecting a national landmark; 
8. The temperature difference on both sides of the bar and how its 
removal could change the climate and wind patterns; 
9. The pit is so close that it will create a nuisance; 
10. Unlike the England pit that Allen Young refers to as also being in the 
area, here there is no barrier between Stockton and where they would be running 
their crusher (R. 90-96). 
The County's planning staff recommended denial of Diamond's application for a 
conditional use permit based in part on the failure to provide the requested EIS. 
The staff of die Department of Engineering makes the following 
recommendation based on the above stated information available to 
diem, that the Tooele County Planning Commission deny the 
application for a conditional use permit. . . with the following 
considerations: 
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1. The applicant has stated that they will not spend the money 
required to conduct the environmental impact study to identify 
and recommend mitigation measures for die operation of a 
gravel pit, batch and asphalt plant. 
2. The lack of the environmental impact study . . . makes the 
application incomplete and . . . the application cannot be 
passed. 
3. . . . without the data required in conducting the environment 
impact statement, the Planning Commission is left with no 
information to assure that such use will not, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to the 
health, safety, comfort, order or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity and nuisances that would 
not be in harmony with neighboring uses will be abated by the 
conditions imposed. Therefore, the Planning Commission 
cannot approve the application. 
(R. 090.) 
Before the Planning Commission on February 7, 2001, Diamond's counsel argued 
that die property was zoned for gravel pit operations, that the owners should be able to do 
what diey want with the property and that Diamond did not want to pay for an EIS. 
Diamond presented no evidence as to the impacts of the proposed use or appropriate 
conditions for dealing with impacts. Commission members discussed the need to know 
specific information about the proposed operation at the proposed site. The public 
comments were largely against the issuance of a permit on public welfare grounds. The 
commission voted to table the application until an EIS was completed. (Minutes, Tooele 
County Planning Commission work meeting, February 7, 2001, R. 080-88.) 
Diamond's counsel subsequently notified the County that Diamond would not 
procure the EIS and requested a final decision on its conditional use permit application. 
Diamond B-Y Ranches has concluded that going forward with the full 
EIS, in light of the cost and public opposition, would be futile. It is 
dierefore the request of Diamond B-Y Ranches to be placed on die 
Planning Commission calendar for approval or rejection of its 
Conditional Use Permit request, based upon any reasonable condition 
imposed on any of the gravel operations permitted in the year 2000. 
(Letter from Allen K. Young, dated June 11, 2001, R. 79-80.) 
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The Planning Commission reviewed the application at its business meeting on 
July 18, 2001. Diamond's counsel confirmed that Diamond did not want to obtain the EIS 
and wished to be granted a permit with conditions similar to those imposed on other gravel 
pits at different locations under different factual circumstances. It presented no evidence as 
to the impacts of the proposed use at this site or appropriate conditions for dealing with 
impacts. It also provided no evidence that the conditions imposed on other gravel pit 
operations in the County would address concerns and potential problems arising from its 
proposed use of the Property. After discussing the need to know specific information about 
the proposed operation at the proposed site, the commission voted unanimously to deny 
Diamond's application. (Minutes, Tooele County Planning Commission, business meeting, 
July 18, 2001, R. 74-77.) 
Diamond appealed the Planning Commission Decision to the Board of County 
Commissioners who heard the appeal on September 18, 2001. The Commission voted 2-1 
to deny the conditional use permit, affirming the Planning Commission decision, based 
largely on the health and safety concerns for the residents of die Town of Stockton. 
(Minutes, Tooele County Board of Commissioners, September 18, 2001, R. 63-64). 
On October 15, 2001, Diamond commenced this action seeking $6 million as 
compensation for a taking of its property pursuant to Utah Constitution Article I, 
Section 22 and die Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. On 
August 19, 2002, the County sought summary judgment on Diamond's claims. (R. 11-
13.) After briefing by the parties, the County's motion came before the district court, 
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy presiding, on April 24, 2003. At the completion of the hearing, 
die court requested that the parties brief a very narrow legal issue: whether an application 
for a conditional use permit rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property right, 
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the deprivation of which would support a takings claim. (Transcript of Hearing pp. 36-
37.) 
The court subsequently issued a memorandum decision on May 22, 2003. (R. 271-
76, copy enclosed at Addendum A.) The court first ruled that Diamond had no legitimate 
expectation that its conditional use would be approved and therefore had "no protected 
property interest in a conditional use.55 (R. 273.) It concluded that denial of the 
conditional use permit application was not a compensable talcing. (R. 272.) 
The court also ruled that this matter need not even be determined on constitutional 
grounds, because Diamond simply failed to carry its burden to provide sufficient 
information in order to obtain approval of a conditional use permit. It noted specifically 
that "Diamond made no meaningful attempt to satisfy the requirements for the granting of 
a conditional use permit and consequently received the inevitable denial of the application.55 
(R. 272.) It concluded that the denial was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. (R. 272.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the core of this matter are two fundamental issues, one substantive and the odier 
procedural: (1) Where a use is conditionally allowed under local ordinance, does a property 
owner have a constitutionally protected right to use his property for the conditionally 
permitted use which precludes a denial of an application for a conditional use permit? (2) 
May a landowner make application for a conditional use permit provided by ordinance, 
make no meaningful attempt to satisfy the requirements for the granting of the use, force 
die inevitable denial of the application and then proceed to seek compensation based on a 
characterization of the denial as a talcing of the property? The answer to both is no.2 
2Diamond argues that the trial court "dismissed55 its takings claim for die additional 
reason diat it had remaining economic use in die property and diat diere were disputed 
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As a threshold matter, the constitutional takings question was improperly before the 
trial court. It is a principle of longstanding jurisprudence that courts do not address 
constitutional questions which can be resolved on state law grounds. The fundamental 
question of whether Diamond had a right to its conditional use which could not be denied 
by die County is a question of state law. This issue may properly be resolved by die 
statutorily provided judicial review of county land use decisions under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-1001. If the court determined a property right to exist, the County's decision 
could be reversed and remanded for new proceedings or the issuance of the permit. The 
statutory review is intended to provide just such an expedited review of land use decisions 
while avoiding exposure of counties to constitutional claims arising from good faith 
interpretations of their ordinances. The trial court recognized these principles and, 
concluding that Diamond's action ccis not an issue that needs a constitutional 
determination,55 reviewed the facts of record under the standards of § 17-27-1001 and 
concluded that the County's denial was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. That ruling was 
correct as a matter of law and should be affirmed. 
Diamond's takings claim also fails as a matter of law. Bodi Utah and federal takings 
law requires as a direshold matter that one who claims a taking of property must first and 
foremost establish a legally recognized, constitutionally protected property interest. State 
and federal law both look to state law to determine whether there is such a protected 
interest. A unilateral expectation that a permit application will be granted does not amount 
to a protected property right. Any such claim is undermined by the existence of significant 
discretion in the governmental body to approve or deny the permit. Utah law grants broad 
questions of fact related to that issue. The trial court, however, expressly did not base its 
summary judgment on that third issue. (R. 272.) 
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discretion to evaluate, approve or deny a conditional use permit. As a result, there is no 
constitutionally protected property interest in the favorable consideration or approval of an 
application for a conditional use permit. At most, under Utah law, Diamond possessed die 
right to make application for conditional use under the ordinance as it existed at the time of 
application and to establish pursuant to the applicable ordinances that it should be granted 
the use. The trial court correctly determined that Diamond had no protected property 
interest to support its takings claim. 
Even if there were a protected property interest in a conditional use, a talcing by its 
very definition must result from a governmental action. Though the County denied 
Diamond's application, the denial was largely based upon procedural grounds, i.e., 
Diamond failed to make any evidentiary showing to satisfy the requirements of the 
conditional use ordinance. Instead of supporting its application, Diamond simply 
announced to die County that it would no longer participate in the application process and 
demanded diat the County approve or deny its application on the then-current state of the 
record. The County had no choice but to deny the application or subject itself to a 
potential challenge by neighboring landowners or residents of the Town of Stockton that 
the conditional use was improperly granted. Diamond was not denied its conditional use 
based upon a decision by a governmental body on the merits of its application. The real 
cause of Diamond's alleged loss was its conscious choice to effectively abandon die 
conditional use application. There was no governmental action resulting in a talcing, 
regulatory or otherwise. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DIAMOND HAS NO 
RIGHT, ENTITLEMENT OR PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST IN 
THE UNILATERAL EXPECTATION OF FAVORABLE 
CONSIDERATION OR APPROVAL OF AN APPLICATION FOR A 
CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A 
TAKINGS CLAIM. 
In its application widi the County, before the trial court and once again here on 
appeal, Diamond has leapfrogged over the necessary prerequisites to make its argument diat 
the County effected a regulatory talcing of its property. At the application stage, Diamond 
effectively abandoned the application and submitted no materials which could support the 
County's approval of its conditional use pursuant to county ordinance. It opted instead to 
proceed immediately with its taldngs claims. Though afforded an opportunity by the trial 
court to specifically brief the issue of whedier it possessed a constitutionally protected 
property interest, Diamond chose instead to reargue federal regulatory taldngs law on die 
unwaiTanted assumption that there was such an interest. Here, it takes the same cart before 
the horse approach in arguing that the existence of a protected property interest is 
"irrelevant55 to the taldngs analysis. This approach, however, ignores well-established Utah 
and federal law which requires die demonstration of a constitutionally protected property 
interest before undertaking an analysis of any constitutional claim, including regulatory 
taldngs claims. 
Diamond has consistently ignored three fundamental legal issues. First, a federal 
taldngs claim is simply not ripe for review until a plaintiff has fully pursued and been denied 
its state law taldngs claim. Second, both state and federal law require a plaintiff to establish 
a legally recognized, constitutionally protected property interest to support a taldngs claim. 
Third, bodi state and federal law look to state law to determine whedier there is a 
constitutionally protected property interest. Diamond's arguments notwithstanding, simple 
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ownership of property does not preclude all police power regulation of the use of the 
property. 
The first step in asserting a takings claim under Article I, Section 22 is for the 
claimant to establish a "protectable interest in property.55 Strawberry Elec. Service Dist. v. 
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996). The same is true for a Fifth 
Amendment takings claim. Maritrans, Inc. v. U.S., 342 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed.Cir. 2003) 
(First step in taldngs analysis is evaluation of "whether the claimant has established a 
'property interest5 for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.55); Mclntyre v. Bayer, 339 F.3d 
1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In order to state a claim under the Taldngs Clause, a plaintiff 
must first establish that he possesses a constitutionally protected property interest.55 citing 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.. 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 
(1984)). The existence of a property interest presents a question of law for the trial court. 
Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995); Tarabishi v. McAlester 
Regional Hosp., 827 F.2d 648, 652 (10th Cir. 1987). Simply arguing that an action is a 
regulatory taking does not relieve a claimant of the burden to establish a legally identified, 
constitutionally protected property interest. Mclntyre, for example, was a regulatory 
taldngs case.3 
A property interest arises only from a claim of entitlement as established by state law. 
Tacobs, Visconsi & Tacobs v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (10th Cir. 1991). 
The property interest, to merit constitutional protection, must exist in fact rather dian in die 
abstract. 
3We note that Diamond's Fifth Amendment takings claim is unripe unless and until 
it has been denied compensation under an Article I, Section 22 action. Patterson 11 35, 67 
P.3d at 476-77. Because Diamond has focused its taldngs inquiry almost exclusively on 
federal taldngs law, we address federal law in addition to Utah law. 
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To have a property in teres t . . . a person clearly must have more than 
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it. He must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. 
Bd. of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
See also discussion in Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,1ft 23-27, 67 P.3d 466, 
473-74. Where the alleged property right is based upon issuance of a permit, a plaintiff 
"must demonstrate that there is a set of conditions the fulfillment of which would give rise 
to legitimate expectation to the . . . permits they seek.55 First Bet Toint Venture v. City of 
Central City, 818 F.Supp. 1409, 1413 (D. Colo. 1993). "In the entitlement analysis nearly 
all courts focus on whether there is discretion in the defendants to deny a zoning or odier 
application.55 Norton v. Village of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 931 (10th Cir. 1996). It is 
well-established federal law that local permitting process only grants a constitutionally 
protected entitlement where the local decision malcer "lacks all discretion to deny issuance of 
the permit or to widihold its approval.55 Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 
(4th Cir. 1992). "Any significant discretion conferred upon the local agency defeats the 
claim of a property interest.55 Id.4 
Bodi federal and state law require more than a unilateral expectation to establish a 
protected property interest. In Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207 
4Diamond mischaracterizes the trial court's ruling as being based upon die 
reasonableness of die governmental action. It is not whether it is reasonable for the County 
to deny die conditional use permit, but whether it has the discretion to do so diat governs 
whether there is a legitimate expectation that gives rise to a protected property right. The 
trial court did not rule diat Diamond had no protected property interest because the 
County could impose reasonable land use regulation, but radier that Diamond had only a 
unilateral, unreasonable expectation of approval of its conditional use application and diat 
expectation does not give rise to a protected property interest. 
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(10th Cir. 2000) the Tenth Circuit discussed the evaluation of property interests in the land 
use context which entitle a party to constitutional protections. 
In municipal land use regulation cases such as this, the entitlement 
analysis presents a question of law and focuses on whether there is 
discretion in the defendants to deny a zoning or other application filed 
by the plaintiffs. The entitlement analysis centers on the degree of 
discretion given the decision maker and not on the probability of the 
decision's favorable outcome. To prevail, the developer must therefore 
demonstrate that a set of conditions exist under state and local law, the 
fulfillment of which would give rise to a legitimate expectation that the 
City Council would approve the developer's plat. In other words, the 
developer must show that under the applicable law, the City Council 
had limited discretion to disapprove the proposed plat. Otherwise, the 
city's decisionmaking lacks sufficient substantive limitations to invoke 
due process guarantees. 
Id. at 1210 (punctuation, citations omitted).5 
In a case similar to this one where a conditional use ordinance provided substantial 
discretion for the county to approve or deny the permit, a federal court found no 
constitutionally protected property interest in a conditional use. 
[T]he Ordinance provides the Commission and Board substantial 
discretion. Thus, Henry's interest in obtaining a conditional use 
permit is, at best, a unilateral expectation and not a protected property 
interest. Accordingly, widiout a property interest in the conditional 
use permit, plaintiffs substantive due process argument necessarily 
fails. 
Henry v. Tefferson County Planning Comm'm 148 F.Supp.2d 698, 714 (N.D.W.Va. 
2001), ajfd in relevant part, 2002 WL 864267 (4th Cir. 2002), cert, denied^ _ U.S. _ , 
123 S.Ct. 1620, 155 L.Ed.2d484 (2003). 
5Although most frequently discussed in due process cases, the constitutionally 
protected property interest is identical in due process and taldngs analysis. E.g., Rocky 
Mountain Materials 8c Asphalt, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of El Paso County, 972 
F.2d309, 311 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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Similarly, die Utah Supreme Court requires more than a unilateral expectation to 
support a protected property interest. E.g., Strawberry Elec. 918 P.2d at 878. Recently, 
citing Roth and the Tenth Circuit Tacobs case, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a 
unilateral expectation is insufficient to create a property right under state law. Patterson 7, 
MI 23-24, 67 P.3d at 473. 
The property interest inquiry must be focused on state law and county ordinance. 
Utah law does not create a protected interest in a conditional use. cTt is established that an 
owner of property holds it subject to zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a 
[municipality's] police power.55 Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 
388, 390 (Utah 1980). The County has been given a broad grant of police power to enact 
ordinances diat "are necessary and proper to provide for die safety, and preserve die health, 
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, and good order, comfort, and 
convenience of the county and its inhabitants, and for the protection of property in the 
county.55 Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-223(l)(a). In State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 
1125 (Utah 1980) the Supreme Court held that this language must be "liberally construed 
to accord to a municipality wide discretion in the exercise of the police power.556 
By definition, Utah statute and Tooele County ordinance both unambiguously 
establish die possibility that an application for a conditional use permit may not be 
approved in any particular area. 
"Conditional use55 means a land use that, because of its unique 
characteristics or potential impact on die county, surrounding 
neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas 
6Hutchinson dealt with § 10-8-84, granting city powers, which is identical, in 
relevant part, to the provision in § 17-53-223(1)(a) which grants the same powers to 
counties. 
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or may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that 
mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(c) (emphasis added). The County's ordinance is identical. 
Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele Covmty § 7-1 (R. 113). Both Utah statute and the 
County's conditional use ordinance give considerable discretion in approving or denying 
applications for conditional uses. The County also has express statutory authority to deny 
conditional uses as well as to regulate them. 
A zoning ordinance may contain provisions for administrative 
decisions relating to conditional uses that may be allowed, allowed 
with conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts, based on 
compliance with standards and criteria set forth in the zoning 
ordinance for those uses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-406(1) (emphasis added). 
To avoid any unilateral expectation of entitlement, Tooele County ordinance 
expressly provides that there is no presumption that a conditional use identified for a 
particular zoning district will be automatically granted at any particular site within the zone. 
The listing of a conditional use in any table of permitted and 
conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of this Uniform 
Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County for each category of zoning 
district does not constitute an assurance or presumption that such 
conditional use will be approved. Rather, each proposed conditional 
use shall be evaluated on an individual basis, in relation to its 
compliance with the standards and conditions set forth in this chapter 
and with the standards for the district in which it is located, in order 
to determine whether the conditional use is appropriate at the 
particular location. 
§7 -3 , Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County (R. 113, emphasis added). 
The seminal Utah case addressing conditional uses is Thurston v. Cache County, 626 
P.2d 440 (Utah 1981). In addressing claims for declaratory relief and equal protection 
violations, the Thurston court discussed the county's discretion in granting or denying an 
application for a conditional use permit. 
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County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of 
the applicable zoning ordinance and are not at liberty either to grant 
or deny conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. 
Within the boundaries established by such standards, however, the 
zoning authority is afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its 
decisions are afforded a strong presumption of validity. Where such 
decisions have been made, courts will not interfere unless they are 
plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable, or abusive of discretion. 
Thurston at 444-45 (emphasis added). The boundaries established by the zoning ordinance 
may be fairly broad so long as they provide some basis for judicial review. 
While it is true diat a zoning ordinance must set some ascertainable 
boundaries on the exercise of discretion by a zoning authority, such 
boundaries are not required to be unduly rigid or detailed. A 
generalized exposition of overall standards or policy goals suffices to 
direct the inquiry and deliberation of the zoning authority, and to 
permit appellate review of the decision. 
Thurston at 443-44. The Tooele County ordinance satisfies these requirements with the 
result that the County has broad discretion in approving or denying conditional use 
permits. 
Diamond has acknowledged all along that it purchased the property "with the 
singular expectation of mining sand and gravel. . ." (Complaint H 8, R. 003.) Coupled 
with that singular and unilateral expectation, Diamond initiated its conditional use 
application under the unwarranted presumption that die County had no discretion to deny 
its proposed conditional use. Its failure to meaningfully pursue die application process to 
its conclusion was also based on that fundamentally erroneous viewpoint. 
Utah law, however, provides broad discretion for a local body to approve or deny a 
conditional use permit. It naturally follows that if die body may deny the conditional use 
permit, die use itself-in this case sand and gravel excavation-is not a constitutionally 
protected property right or entitlement. As a result, Diamond's unilateral expectation of 
approval does not give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest in its proposed 
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sand and gravel extraction from the property. Lacking that constitutionally protected 
property interest. Diamond is unable to state a claim under either Utah or federal law for an 
uncompensated talcing of its property. The trial court's analysis and ruling on diis issue are 
correct as a matter of law and merit affirmation by this Court. 
H. THE COUNTY'S DENIAL OF DIAMOND'S APPLICATION FOR A 
CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT, AMENDMENT TO ITS ZONING 
ORDINANCE AND DENIAL OF DIAMOND'S REZONING 
APPLICATION DID N O T EFFECT A REGULATORY TAKING. 
It is axiomatic that a taking of property giving rise to constitutionally-mandated 
compensation can occur only when property is taken or damaged for public use by a 
governmental body. It is clear from the record that it was not the County's regulatory 
denial of the conditional use which prevented Diamond from obtaining its permit. 
Diamond simply made no effort to establish a record upon which the County could have 
approved the permit consistent with the requirements of the applicable ordinances. 
Diamond's insistence upon not completing the requirements for approval and forcing a 
decision widiout making any evidentiary showing resulted in an adverse decision 
attributable solely to Diamond and was not the taldng of property for a public use. 
Before a landowner may assert a regulatory takings claim it must pursue a 
meaningful application for development approval. E.g., Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz. 818 
F.2d 1449, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the Supreme Court in MacDonakt 
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 353, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 
(1986), gave approval to the "meaningful application55 requirement.) An abandoned 
application is not "meaningful55 for takings purposes. Kinzli at 1455. 
Diamond effectively abandoned its conditional use application without ever making 
any real attempt to provide the County widi sufficient information regarding the potential 
adverse impacts of a gravel operation at diat specific site. It did not assist the County in 
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determining what, if any, conditions might mitigate those impacts at that particular 
location. Instead, it simply suggested that the same conditions be imposed which had been 
attached to other gravel pit operations at different locations in the County. This is not the 
type of conditions contemplated by either Utah statute or Tooele County ordinance. 
Unable to persuade the County to disregard site-specific concerns and unwilling to help 
identify and deal with diose concerns, Diamond notified the county that it would no longer 
participate in the application process and demanded a decision on its application. The 
County's denial based upon Diamond's failure to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance 
was not a regulation of the property. As a result, it could not be a regulatory taking of the 
property. 
The absurdity of Diamond's arguments is illustrated by the logical conclusion that 
they dictate. If Diamond can successfully claim a talcing based upon a denial of an 
application for failure to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance, any property owner 
could claim a talcing. The owner need only apply for a use to which it was not 
presumptively entitled, fail to satisfy the procedural requirements for obtaining approval of 
that use, force a denial of the application and then proceed with a claim for a regulatory 
talcing. The constitutional takings protections do not sweep so broadly. 
Diamond is also unable to base its takings claims on the County's amendment of its 
zoning ordinance to create the MG-EX zone and denial of its rezoning application. Only if 
Diamond had the absolute right under the previous ordinance to use the property for sand 
and gravel extraction would the zoning amendment have impaired a right giving rise to a 
takings claim. However, the only right vested in Diamond by the zoning ordinance prior to 
its amendment was the right to seek a conditional use permit. See discussion in Patterson 
111126-27, 67 P.3d 474. 
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Diamond's extensive discussion of federal regulatory takings law does not resolve die 
issues here. The concept of regulatory taldngs was first implied by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 
(1922) (referring to regulation that "goes too far" as a taking). However, cc[a] court cannot 
determine whether a regulation has gone ctoo far5 unless it knows how far the regulation 
goes." MacDonald 477 U.S. at 348, 106 S.Ct. at 2566. Sixty-five years after the 
Pennsylvania Coal decision, the U.S. Supreme Court still recognized that legitimate police 
power regulation does not affect a taking. 
Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held 
under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be 
injurious to die community, and the Taldngs Clause did not transform 
that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State 
asserts its power to enforce it. 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 
1245, 94 L.Ed.2d472 (1987) (punctuation, citations omitted, emphasis added). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has also observed that c[l]and use planning is not an all-or-nothing 
proposition. A government entity is not required to permit a landowner to develop 
property to [the] full extent he might desire or be charged with an unconstitutional talcing 
of the property.55 MacDonald 477 U.S. at 347, 106 S.Ct. at 2565. 
The Utah Constitution also permits reasonable regulation of property without giving 
rise to a takings claim. 
Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do 
widi and on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a 
significant impact on the utility or value of the property, yet they 
generally do not require compensation under article I, section 11. 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.r 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990). This has long been 
recognized in Utah law. 
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The cases are numerous to the effect that... the state may without 
compensation regulate and restrain the use of private property when 
the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public requires or demands 
it; . . . that the exercise of proper police regulations may to some 
extent prevent enjoyment of individual rights in property or cause 
inconvenience or loss to the owner, does not necessarily render the 
police law unconstitutional, for the reason that such laws are not 
considered as appropriating private property for a public use, but 
simply as regulating its use and enjoyment, and if the owner through a 
lawful exercise of the power suffers inconvenience, injury, or a loss, it 
is regarded as damnum absque injuria . . . 
Bountiful City v. De Luca, 292 P. 194 at 199-200 (Utah 1930) (emphasis added). 
Because Diamond short-circuited the application process, we cannot know whetiier 
the County's regulation of its property would go too far. At this point it is purely 
speculative whether the County would have ultimately denied the conditional use or would 
have granted it with conditions. Whether those conditions would have gone too far is also 
sheer speculation. 
As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, the true categorical regulatory talcing is 
"relatively rare.53 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1018, 112 S.Ct. 
2886, 2894, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Because Diamond has emphasized its reliance on 
the Lucas decision since early in its dealings with the County, it is helpful to examine the 
operative facts of that case. In Lucas, the plaintiff had paid a premium price for the 
property based upon its beachfront location and the previous approval of two residential 
lots in a subdivision on which he intended to construct single-family dwelling units. The 
regulation at issue in Lucas was imposed after the plaintiff had acquired the two approved 
residential lots. The subsequent regulation therefore affected the right to build a residence 
on the property, a right which the owners acquired with their title. By contrast, the Lucas 
court noted that regulatory limitations which "inhere in the title itself5 are binding on the 
purchaser of the property. Lucas 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. at 2900. 
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Diamond cites several federal cases for the proposition that it had no burden to 
establish a protected property interest where it has alleged a regulatory taking. However, 
the cited case law simply does not obviate the threshold requirement of identifying a 
protected property interest to pursue any Fifth Amendment claim, including a takings 
claim. In fact, those cases implicitly include that requirement in their analysis. For example 
in Penn. Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S. 104, 124 S.Ct. 2646, 
57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), the court noted that the plaintiffs had identified a property interest 
in the airspace above the terminal and alleged that the city ordinance deprived them of 
gainful use of that property right. Penn. Central 438 U.S. at 130, 98 S.Ct. at 2662. Much 
of the discussion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002) turned on the type of 
property interests at issue and whether the plaintiff could create several property interests 
from one. Tahoe-Sierra 535 U.S. at 318, 122 S.Ct. at 1476. In Rith Energy, Inc. v. U.S., 
247 F.3d 1355 (Fed.Cir. 2001) the court held only that the plaintiff need not establish "die 
scope of its property interest55 in an administrative proceeding prior to litigating a regulatory 
takings claim. Rith Energy at 1366. Rith Energy did not waive the fundamental 
requirement that a protected property interest exist and be demonstrated to the trial court. 
Diamond identifies no case which has held that a plaintiff need not demonstrate a 
constitutionally protected property interest to prevail on a state or federal takings claim, 
regardless of whether it was a regulatory takings claim. Contrary to Diamond's argument, 
the protected property interest analysis is not irrelevant to any takings claim. 
When Diamond acquired its property, it was zoned MU-40. Although there are a 
number of permitted uses in the MU-40 zone, such as single-family dwellings and 
two-family dwellings (duplex) (R. 115-118), sand and gravel extraction and the operation 
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of batch plants and hot asphalt plants are not among those uses. Diamond's proposed uses 
were conditionally permitted uses subject to discretionary approval pursuant to the County's 
conditional use ordinance. Diamond had no absolute right to use the property in the way it 
proposed. In terms used by the Lucas court, the right to extract sand and gravel or operate 
batching and asphalt plants did not inhere in the title itself. Instead, Diamond had only the 
right to apply for die conditional use of the property and was entitled to that use only upon 
making the evidentiary showing required by ordinance. It exercised the right to apply for 
the permit but failed to make the requisite evidentiary showing to justify the County's 
approval of the conditional use. The County's denial did not interfere with any right which 
existed at the time Diamond acquired the property or made its application for conditional 
use. 
Under die Lucas analysis, if the County had refused to accept Diamond's conditional 
use application or denied it despite Diamond having made die requisite showing or refused 
to process die conditional use application after amending the ordinance, we might be faced 
with a regulatory taking. Even more akin to Lucas would be a situation where the 
conditional use permit was issued and the County subsequently prevented the use of the 
property due to public safety concerns as residential development encroached upon an 
existing gravel pit operation. Such facts are conspicuously absent here. 
What took place here was not regulatory interference with a recognized, 
constitutionally protected property interest. Diamond had no absolute right to conduct 
sand and gravel extraction or batch or asphalt plant operations on its property at this 
location. Amendment of the MU-40 zone provisions to exclude those operations was not a 
regulatory talcing. The right which Diamond did have, that which inhered in its title, was 
to apply for and make a showing to support entitlement to a conditional use. It was not 
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governmental action which brought the conditional use application process to a close, but a 
conscious unilateral decision by Diamond not to continue with the process, not to help 
identify potential negative impacts, and not to suggest reasonable conditions to mitigate 
those site-specific impacts. If there was an interference with Diamond's property interest, it 
was self-inflicted and did not result from regulatory action, much less amount to a 
regulatory taking. 
m . THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS NOT IMPROPERLY BASED 
UPON A FACTUAL FINDING. 
Diamond argues that, despite the existence of disputed facts, the trial court made a 
factual finding that it had failed to satisfy the requirements for granting the conditional use 
permit. Summary judgment, however, is often appropriate despite the existence of factual 
disputes where the disputed facts are not material to the legal questions presented. Fink v. 
Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 655 (Utah App. 1995) (summary judgment appropriate despite 
multiple disputed facts where those facts were immaterial); Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle 
Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah App. 1994) ("the mere existence of genuine issues of 
fact. . . does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to 
the resolution of die case."). To constitute a fact which would preclude summary 
judgment, the fact must be material to the applicable rule of law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). The disputed facts advanced by Diamond are immaterial to 
the fundamental legal issues presented to and ruled upon by the trial court. Summary 
judgment was dierefore appropriate. 
Diamond's position focuses on the argument that "facts concerning the EIS were 
hotly disputed and therefore not an appropriate basis for a summary judgment.55 
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(Appellant's Brief p. 26.)7 This argument ignores the core undisputed facts that (1) the 
record before the County was devoid of any evidence to support the grant of the 
conditional use permit (Diamond did not submit any information but relied solely on the 
two-page application originally submitted by Geneva Rock Products, Inc. and later assigned 
to Diamond) (R. 107-108); and (2) Diamond abandoned the application process and 
forced the adverse decision based upon the dearth of support. At the trial court hearing on 
die County's motion, counsel for the County pointed out the dilemma presented by these 
facts. 
If- assuming hypothetically the conditional use permit had been 
granted, and Stockton town or the residents of Stockton had brought 
a similar statutory petition for review under 17-27- [1001], what 
evidence or information could we point to in the record that was 
7Diamond spends considerable time focusing on the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS). The EIS, however, was proposed simply as a means of identifying 
whether there would be site-specific adverse impacts from the conditional use and what 
those impacts may be. That information would be used to determine what conditions were 
necessary to mitigate the impacts. The real issue is that Diamond simply did not establish a 
record as required by ordinance, that would justify approval of its proposed use. The 
ordinance requires, among other things, that the County approve a conditional use only if 
the use "will not, under the circumstances of this particular case, be detrimental to the 
health, safety, comfort, order or general welfare of persons residing or working in the 
vicinity;55 or conditions for the use will mitigate those health and safety concerns. 
Diamond, despite die fact that it had the burden to support its application, failed to offer 
any other information in lieu of the EIS to address the potential impacts of its conditional 
use and to help the County formulate conditions to mitigate those impacts arising from 
conducting diat use at the particular site. Diamond did approach the County with lists of 
conditions which had been imposed on sand and gravel operations at other locations. In 
essence, it told the County that diese conditions were acceptable to it and if the County did 
not approve the use with these or similar conditions, it would commence takings litigation. 
It made no meaningful attempt to help the County widi its duty to identify and mitigate 
site-specific impacts. Absent anything in the record to reach those conclusions, die County 
had no choice but to deny the application. The absence of an evidentiary basis for approval 
is due to Diamond's conscious and deliberate choice not to further pursue die application, 
not any affirmative regulatory action by die County. 
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actually presented to and considered by the decision makers that 
would support the issuance of that permit? The record is totally 
devoid of any basis to grant the permit, and that's really the problem. 
(R. 295, T. 6.) 
The trial court understood this problem and expressly asked Diamond's counsel to 
identify any evidence which indicated diat Diamond had addressed the concerns regarding 
adverse impacts. (R. 295, T. 30-31.) Diamond's counsel simply responded that producing 
the EIS would have been futile and made no effort to identify what it proposed as to 
mitigation of legitimate adverse impacts. (R. 295, T.31-33.) 
The record before the County and before the trial court contains absolutely no 
evidence diat Diamond had attempted to satisfy its burden to support the granting of die 
conditional use application. The trial court did not have to make any findings of facts 
which were disputed by the parties. The simple fact is that the required evidence does not 
exist. That absence of factual support that Diamond had meaningfully pursued its 
application leads directly to the conclusion that it had not. The trial court made no 
impermissible findings of fact in reaching diat conclusion. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT BASE ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
A FINDING OF FACT WITH RESPECT TO THE ECONOMIC USES OF 
THE PROPERTY. 
The trial court, prefacing its observation with the statement that it was "unnecessary 
to the opinion/5 simply stated that what Diamond now owns is what it purchased. 
Finally, even though it is unnecessary to the opinion, as Diamond had 
no protected property right in a conditional use, this Court sees no 
deprivation of reasonable or economically beneficial use of the 
Property by die denial of the conditional use permit. It is axiomatic 
that Diamond cannot argue that the denial of a conditional use of the 
Property somehow deprives it of all reasonable or economically 
beneficial use of the Property. The denial of a conditional expectancy 
does not extinguish the use to which the Property was put to before 
the application process was initiated. The Property can be put to the 
same reasonable or economically beneficial uses it has historically had, 
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and had at the time of the permit application. The mere fact that 
Diamond purchased the Property with the unilateral expectation that it 
could obtain a conditional use of the Property, for something other 
than its then-existing use, does not create a deprivation of all 
reasonable or economically beneficial use of the property. 
(R. 271-72.) As expressly stated by the trial court, that part of the ruling is dictum. 
Moreover, it is merely a legal conclusion rather than a finding based upon factual evidence. 
This simple observation provides no basis for reversing the summary judgment. 
V. LOCAL LAND USE DECISIONS ARE MATTERS OF STATE LAW 
MORE APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED THROUGH THE 
STATUTORILY PROVIDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
DO NOT RISE TO CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 provides for judicial review for adverse land use 
decisions. Diamond attempted to avoid the statutory review by conceding that die 
County's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, but nonetheless asserting that the very 
decision which is subject to statutory review constitutes a regulatory talcing of its property. 
The purpose of § 17-27-1001 is to provide an expedited means of determining the 
reasonableness of local land use decisions and if those decisions are determined to be 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal, they are subject to reversal. Even if Diamond is right in its 
belief that it is entitled to the conditional use permit, the remedy is reversal of the County's 
denial and issuance of the permit, not an automatic assumption that a talcing has occurred. 
Diamond has not identified any case law, state or federal, which entitles a landowner 
to abandon an application, effectively creating a self-imposed hardship, subsequently avoid 
an available judicial review of the resulting adverse decision and proceed immediately to 
assert a takings claim based upon denial of the application for procedural reasons. In a 
§ 17-27-1001 review, Diamond would have the opportunity to attempt to establish an 
entitlement to die conditional use permit as a matter of law. If such an entitlement exists, 
die matter could be remanded to the County and the conditional use permit would be 
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issued. In essence, the judicial review provides a safety valve to prevent the unnecessary 
constitutionalization of routine land use decisions. It is axiomatic in the judicial system that 
where a matter can be dealt with on non-constitutional grounds, courts do not address 
constitutional claims. Kg.y Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,11 26, 52 P.3d 1158, 1166 (cc[I]t 
is fundamental diat constitutional issues should be avoided if the case can properly be 
decided on non-constitutional grounds.55); Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 
1980) ("[A] constitutional question is not to be reached if the merits of the case in hand 
may be fairly determined on other than constitutional grounds.55) See also Patterson, 1111 24-
25, 67 P.3d at 473 (observing that violations of state law do not automatically constitute 
violations of constitutional rights). 
Allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a constitutional claim where a state law remedy 
is available unfairly deprives a municipality of the opportunity to make a good faith 
application of its ordinances without the risk of exposure to a constitutional claim, 
particularly a very expensive takings claim. As correctly observed by the trial court, diis 
matter does not require resolution on constitutional grounds because, due to Diamonds 
failure to satisfy its burden to support its conditional use application, the County's decision 
was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. There is no justification in state or federal law for 
this matter to escalate to a constitutional takings claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that Diamond's claims could be resolved as a 
matter of state law as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001. The trial court was also 
correct in concluding that even if a legitimate takings claim were present, that claim failed 
because Diamond, under state law, has no protected property interest in die favorable 
consideration or approval of an application for a conditional use permit which would merit 
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constitutional protection and support either a state or federal taldngs claim. Moreover, the 
failure of Diamond to get its conditional use did not result from regulatory action. It was 
Diamond's conscious tactical decision to abandon its conditional use application in favor of 
pursuing a legally unsupportable takings claim which resulted in the adverse decision on 
procedural grounds. 
The issues presented to the trial court were legal questions which were appropriate 
for summary judgment. The only facts necessary to the court's ruling were those contained 
in the County's record and formed the basis for the § 17-27-1001 review. Those facts are 
undisputed. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to the County was correct as a 
matter of law and should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~> day of November, 2003. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
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